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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON
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STATE OF GEORGIA
THE CITY OF ATLANTA,

)

SEP 0 3 2014

)

Plaintiff,

)
)

v.

)

INSITUFORM TECHNOLOGIES, LLC
f/kla INSITUFORM TECHNOLOGIES

INC., INSITUFORM TECHNOLIGIES,
INC.IIMANI ENVIRONMENTAL
GROUP, INC., a joint venture, and IMANI
ENVIRONMENTAL GROUP, INC.,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

OEPUTY CLERK SUPERIOR COURT
FULTON COUNTY, GA

Civil Action File No.
2011 CV204217

)

Defendants.

)

ORDER ON THE CITY OF ATLANTA'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

On August 13,2014, the parties appeared before the Court to present oral
argument on Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Upon consideration of
the arguments of the parties, the briefs submitted on the Motion, and the record in this
case, the Court finds as follows:
The City of Atlanta (the "City") and Instituform Technologies, LLC and Insituform
Technologies, Inc. and Imani Environmental Group, Inc., a joint venture, (collectively
referred to as "ITI") entered into multiple contracts for sewer rehabilitation projects,
including the three contracts at issue here, known as Contracts C, 0, & E (collectively
referred to as "Contracts").' The parties agree that the Contracts are valid and speak
for themselves.

1 The contracts are officially titled contract FC 3007000000, Sewer Group I Rehabilitation, Phase 11- CIPP
Contract C ("Contract C"), FC-4993, Sewer Group II, Rehabilitation - CIPP Contract D ("Contracts D"),
and FC-4994, Sewer Group II, Rehabilitation - CIPP Contract E ("Contract En).

Each Contract requires ITI, as Contractor, "to perform ... all Work required by the
Agreement Documents." Contracts C, 0, & E, City-Contractor Agreement, p. 1, 111. The
work included in the Agreement Documents was, " ... the renewal and rehabilitation of
selected portions of the sewer collection system in the City of Atlanta, as designated by
the Engineer throughout the course of work." Contracts C, 0, & E, Specifications
Section 01010 - 1.03.

Work is defined as,

All the services specified, indicated, shown, or contemplated by the
Agreement Documents and the furnishing by Contractor of Materials,
Equipment, labor, methods, processes, construction and manufacturing
materials and equipment, tools, plants, supplies, power, water,
transportation and other things necessary to complete such services in
accordance with the Agreement Documents and that will ensure a
functional and complete facility.
Contracts C, 0, & E, City-Contractor Agreement, p. 2,111.
The Contracts incorporate bid schedules showing the scope of items expected to
be installed in accordance with the plans and specifications.

These bid schedules

provide unit prices to be used in combination with the actual quantities installed to
calculate the payment amounts. Each Contract's bid schedule states, " ... the quantities
shown are approximate only and are subject to either increase or decrease ...
[Contractor] understands that payment will be made on the actual quantities at the unit
bid price ... Actual quantities will be determined upon completion of the job." Contracts
C, 0, & E, Exhibit A Bid Form, p. 26.
Further, the Contracts have extensive provisions throughout that specifically
address making changes, including the following:
The City may, from time to time, request changes in the Scope of Work to
be performed by the Contractor hereunder. No such change, including
any increase or decrease in the amount of compensation, which may be
mutually agreed upon by and between the City and Contractor, shall be
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effective and enforceable until and unless a written amendment or change
order to this Agreement has been executed by both parties and attached
hereto.
Contracts C, D, & E, City-Contractor Agreement, p. 4, 115.
A change in the Agreement Price or Agreement Time shall be
accomplished only by Change Order or Change Directive, and no other
compensation shall be due to the Contractor other than that permitted
pursuant to a Change Order or Change Directive. Accordingly, no course
of conduct or dealings between the parties, nor express or implied
acceptance of alterations or additions to the Work, and no claim that the
Owner has been unjustly enriched by any alteration of or addition to the
Work, whether or not there is, in fact, any unjust enrichment shall be the
basis of any claim for an increase in any amounts due under the
Agreement Documents or a change in any time period provided for the
Agreement Documents.
Contracts C, D, & E, GC-41.2.1.2.

ALL CONTRACT CLAIMS FOR CHANGES MUST BE ASSERTED IN
ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE GC-41 OR THEY ARE WAIVED AND
RELEASED.
Contract C, D, & E, GC-41.2.1.3

(Emphasis original).

No eliminations, additions, or alterations shall be made in the Work except
upon written order of The City. No course of conduct or dealings between
the parties, nor express or implied acceptance of alterations or additions
to the Work, and no claim that the City has been unjustly enriched by any
alteration or addition to the Work, whether or not there is, in fact, any
unjust enrichment to the Work, shall be the basis of any claim for an
increase in any amounts due under the Agreement Documents or an
increase in any time period provided for in the Agreement Documents. No
action, conduct, omission, prior failure, or course of dealing by the City
shall waive, modify, change, or alter the requirement that Change Orders
and Change Directives must be in writing signed by the City and/or
Contractor, and that such written Change Orders or Change Directives are
the exclusive methods for effecting any change to the Agreement Price or
Agreement Time. Contractor understands and agrees that the Agreement
Price and Agreement Time cannot be changed by implication, oral
contracts, verbal directives, actions, inactions, course of conduct, or
constructive change order.
Contracts C, D, & E, GC-41.3.
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The City's amended complaint includes claims against ITI for breach of five
sewer rehabilitation project contracts and a claim for violations of O.C.G.A.

§ 23-3-120,

et seq. ITI's amended counterclaim asserts four quantum meruit counterclaims in the
alternative to four counterclaims for breach of Contracts C, D, and E, as well as
Contract A.2 ITI argues that because City inspectors, contract managers, and area
managers made changes to the work in the field without following the prescribed
change procedures, a mutual departure from the contract terms, the quantum meruit
counterclaims can be maintained. The City moves for partial summary judgment on
ITI's quantum meruit counterclaims asserting that the quantum meruit claims cannot be
maintained because express contracts govern and any implied oral contracts allegedly
formed would be ultra vires and void.
A court should grant a motion for summary judgment pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 911-56 when the moving party shows that no genuine issue of material fact remains to be
tried and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, warrant summary judgment as a matter of law. Leu's Corp., Inc. v. Haskins,
261 Ga. 491,491

(1991). In ruling on this motion, the Court considers the Defendants'

First Amended Counterclaim. See Circle H Development, lnc., et al. v. City of
Woodstock, 206 Ga. App. 473, 475-76 (1992) (The trial court properly considered the
amended pleadings of Circle H Development, Inc., when ruling on the City of
Woodstock's motion for summary judgment even though the City of Woodstock did not

2 Defendants added quantum meruit or, alternatively,
breach of Contract A counterclaims after the filing of
the Motion to Dismiss. The Court does not address Contract A because the Motion to Dismiss does not
seek dismissal of this claim and Contract A has not been made part of the record. Without the contract, it
is impossible to determine if similar contractual language demands a similar result as to quantum meruit
claims related to Contract A.
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amend their motion to specifically address Circle H's amended pleadings when Circle H
amended after the hearing on the motion for summary judgment but before the trial
court's ruling).
In this case, the City first argues that the Contracts govern all rights and
responsibilities of the parties and, therefore, ITI's quantum meruit counterclaims cannot
stand. "It has long been the law in Georgia that although a party may plead in
alternative counts, no recovery may be had in quantum meruit when a contract governs
all claimed rights and responsibilities of the parties."

Choate Construction Co. v. Ideal

E/ec. Contractors, 246 Ga. App. 626, 630 (2000). A court can determine that a contract
governs all claimed rights and responsibilities of the parties at summary judgment. See
Holder Construction Group, LLC v. Georgia Tech Facilities, Inc., 282 Ga. App. 796
(2006).
The Contracts extensively list the work items that were needed to complete the
full scope of the sewer rehabilitation projects. Because quantities for the items were
only approximate and expected to vary during construction, the Contracts called for
payment according to established unit prices for the actual quantities installed. The
broad scope of the project, the extensive list of bid items, and the expectation that
quantities would vary each demonstrate that all work needed to complete the sewer
rehabilitation projects was governed by the Contracts.
Further, the Contracts provide explicit procedures for making changes and
require all changes be authorized in writing by Change Order or Change Directive.
Each Contract states that payment for changes will not be made and all claims for
changes are waived unless the applicable procedures are followed. Additionally, the
5

Contracts explicitly bar all implied contract claims based on equitable principles. The
terms of the Contracts show changes were contemplated from the outset, the parties
agreed to an explicit and exclusive procedure for making changes, and ITI understood
the consequences of deviating from those procedures.

ITI has not presented any

evidence that it did any work that was not contemplated by the express Contracts.
Furthermore, ITI admitted that the Contracts govern this dispute in response to
the City's Statement of Undisputed Facts. The Contracts govern all the claimed rights
and responsibilities of the parties and, therefore, the quantum meruit claims cannot
stand.
Relying on O.C.G.A. § 13-4-4, ITI next argues that the parties mutually departed

from the requirements of the Contracts through a course of conduct giving rise to the
quantum meruit counterclaims. A departure from contract terms "must be mutual and
intended, such that the parties have essentially a new agreement concerning the
requirements of the original contract." Pierre v. St. Benedict's Episcopal Day School,
324 Ga. App. 283, 286 (2013) (quoting Duncan v. Lagunas, 253 Ga. 61,62(1) (1984)).
"The question of mutual departure is ordinarily for the factfinder, but it may be decided
by the court on a motion for summary judgment in the absence of evidence to support
such a finding." Pierre, 283 Ga. App. at 286. There is no evidence in the record that the
City intended to depart from the express terms in the Contracts governing modifications
of the Contracts.
Further, any alleged modifications made by City inspectors, contract managers,
and area managers at the rehabilitation sites are not sufficient to bind the City as these
agreements are ultra vires. When a municipal charter or other governing law defines
6

the way a city can approve a contract, the contract must be approved in that manner or
it is ultra vires and void.

City of Baldwin v. Woodard & Curran, 293 Ga. 19,27-28

(2013). A party who contracts with a city is charged with understanding the city's
requirements to contract. City of Baldwin 293 Ga. at 28. "The actions of individual city
officials who are not empowered to act on behalf of the city in such matters cannot be
relied upon by others to commit the government's resources... " Id. at 29.
The City of Atlanta Code of Ordinances requires the city council adopt and the
Mayor approve legislation authorizing contract award. See City of Atlanta Code of
Ordinances § 2-1102. To be enforceable against the City of Atlanta, the contract must
be executed by the Mayor and the Contractor, returned to the City with all required
submittals, attested to by the municipal clerk, and approved to form by the City attorney.
See id. An implied contract arising out of the conduct of City employees, who have no

power to bind the City, does not fulfill any of the requirements of the Code of
Ordinances and is therefore ultra vires and unenforceable.
Because each of the above grounds are adequate for granting partial summary
judgment, the Court finds it unnecessary to address the City's remaining arguments in
support of its Motion. Accordingly, the City of Atlanta's partial motion for summary
judgment is GRANTED as to Defendants' amended counterclaims 2,4, and 6.

SO ORDERED this

'3

day of September, 2014.

ALICE D. BONNER, SENIOR JUDGE
Superior Court of Fulton County
Atlanta Judicial Circuit
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Copies to:

Benjamin H. Sawyer, Esq.
Eric L. Hurst, Esq.
SUTHERLAND ASBILL & BRENNAN LLP
999 Peachtree Street, N.E.
Atlanta, GA 30309
Ben.sawyer@sutherland.com
Eric. hurst@sutherland.com

Attorneys for Defendants Insituform
Technologies, LLC and Insituform
Technologies, Inc. and Imani Environmental
Group, Inc., a Joint Venture
Daniel P. Schoenekase, Esq. (pro hac vice)
Jackson D. Glisson, Esq. (pro hac vice)
GREENSFELDER, HEMKER & GALE P.C.
10 S. Broadway, Suite 2000
St. Louis, MO 63102
jdg@greensfelder.com
dps@greensfelder.com

Registered Agent for Imani Environmental
Group, Inc.
Sabrina Moore, Registered Agent
Imani Environmental Group, Inc.
418 North Main Street
Alpharetta, GA 30009
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